The Electronic Product Code (EPC) is a Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) that offers a new way of automating identification. However, once RFID tags carry more than just an identifier, privacy may be violated. Treating the privacy in early stages helps to master the data view before interpreting and storing it in databases. An RFID middleware is the entity that sits between tag readers and database applications. It is in charge of collecting, filtering, aggregating and grouping the requested events from heterogeneous RFID environments. Thus, the system, at this point, is likely to suffer from parameter manipulation and eavesdropping, raising privacy concerns. We propose a privacy controller module that enhances the Filtering and Collection middleware of the RFID EPCglobal network. We provide a privacy policy-driven model using some enhanced contextual concepts of the extended Role Based Access Control model. To show the feasibility of our privacy-enhanced model, we provide a proof-of-concept prototype integrated into the middleware of the Fosstrak framework, an opensource implementation of the EPCglobal specifications.
INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology offers a new way of automating the identification, the tracking and the storing of information contained on RFID tags. These tags can be attached or embedded in the item to be identified and are read when they enter a readers antenna field. The use of this technology in healthcare services has grown in importance with the need of assisting people (e.g., elderly indiPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. viduals and patients) in their everyday life [11] . In this vein, the Auto-ID Center [20] created the concept of a unique code called Electronic Product Code (EPC). With this technology, critical errors such as prescribing wrong medicines can be avoided, thanks to better monitoring operations. However, once tags carry more than just an identifier, i.e, a bearer's age or illnesses, bearer's privacy may be violated. RFID systems consist typically on tags, readers, and backend applications such as middleware and database to manage and store the collected data. Here, we are interested in the backend side, particularly the middleware component. The middleware sits between the reader and database applications. It is in charge of collecting, filtering, aggregating and grouping the requested events from heterogeneous RFID environments, then compiling them into well-formatted data prior to send them to business application for usability. The system, at this point, is likely to suffer from parameter manipulation and eavesdropping leading to privacy concerns. In this article, we use the properties of filtering and aggregation in the middleware for privacy goals, without interfering with existing standards.
MEDES'13
The definition of not sharing information is a fundamental aspect of privacy [24] , however, the privacy of people focuses today on who has access to what information, rather than what information is collected. A major portion of previous work on privacy has been aligned on anonymizing user information or on preventing personal information from disclosure e.g, by encryption means [3] . These latter works treat some issues of privacy but do not completely handle the different situations where the data owner choose to share information with others. In addition, dealing with encrypted data in the middleware level makes expensive the query process, since not all the collected data are sensitive, rather, the aggregation of some information may need to be protected. In this article, we name as data owner the user who specifies a set of privacy preferences. The preferences depend on the context and privacy dimensions supported by the system.
Numerous reasons motivate the support of privacy issues in the RFID middleware. First, treating the privacy in the middleware helps to master the reading configuration and the data view before interpreting and storing it in upper layer applications. For example, let us consider two distinct applications wanting to receive data about a patient. The first application is only allowed to view the total tag count depending on the requester purpose, while the second one is allowed to view the identity of tags but only of product "GTIN". To treat the applications requests, we propose to handle the privacy policy before the events are generated, since this minimizes, as soon as possible, the risk of unauthorized disclosures. Second, filtering data for privacy issues at the middleware stage has the advantage to relax the event collection in this stage, leading to an appropriate adaptation of the queries executed by the reader over the air interface. This allows readers to use efficiently the limited bandwidth, e.g., target only a particular tag population or switch off completely some readers. Finally, as RFID communication protocols support dedicated privacy enhancing features [22] , the RFID middleware will also need to support their use.
Our contribution in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, we address some privacy concerns of the EPCglobal technology which is currently one of the predominant standardization efforts of the RFID community. Second, we propose a fined control over the privacy controller module [21] that we integrate into the Filtering and Collection middleware. The approach we apply in the EPCglobal middleware is policy-driven. It ensures the following features: (i) enforcing a privacy policy without interfering with the standard middleware interface, (ii) using an existing privacy-aware model [1] to store and manage privacy policy preferences, and (iii) taking into account the declared purpose, the accuracy and the consent dimensions as privacy requirements. To show the feasibility of our approach, we provide a proof-ofconcept prototype that we apply on the open-source software for track and trace Fosstrak [7] . Fosstrak is a recommended implementation of the EPCglobal network interfaces. Paper organization. Section II discusses related work. Section III describes some background about the EPCglobal middleware interfaces. Section IV details the privacy dimensions that can be enforced in the middleware. Section V introduces our privacy model and specification. Section VI describes our privacy enhancement solution applied on Fosstrak. Section VII concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
Most widely deployed middleware products do not fully consider the security requirements when processing sensitive data. Several implementations from software vendors [8, 16] and specialized companies [18] offering RFID middleware functions, manage the access control to historical events stored into final databases. However, they do not provide treatments to enhance privacy policies in accordance with regulations, expected to be done at the middleware level [15] . A possible reason for this issue is that most enterprises run the RFID middleware in an internal network.
Most existent implementations support EPCglobal network. Some of them explicitly include security solutions in the EPCIS (EPC Information Service) level [8, 16, 18] relying mostly on role based access control and encryption models. Although some of these aforementioned products include security enhancements into their middleware implementations [8, 16] , few authors worked on privacy problems. An exception is the work in [9] , where the authors propose to support the EPCglobal middleware via a tool called Privacy Framework Tool plug-in. This tool includes privacy friendly practices and audits to be applied to the proposed middleware. To the best of our knowledge, there have been neither public communication related to the used privacy policy nor information about the plug-in implementation. Table 1 summarizes some middleware security features of several platforms. It shows the version of the EPCglobal middleware interface (ALE) implemented in each tool and the proposed security and privacy approaches at this level. 
Figure 1: EPCglobal middleware
It is worth noting that the ALE 1.1 specification introduces several enhancements of the ALE 1.0, particularly a new API for controlling access to other ALE APIs. So far, all the mentioned products propose a role based access control as a security approach in the middleware. However, they do not present a privacy control integrated solution. For example, the authors do not cite the notion of declared purpose to be applied to the definition of new ECSpecs. This notion is used in our proposition to extend the classical access control model by handling privacy requirements in accordance with known regulations.
THE EPCGLOBAL MIDDLEWARE AND ITS INTERFACE
The EPCglobal network, initially proposed by the MITs Auto-ID Center [20] and further developed by members of the joint-venture EPCglobal, is currently one of the predominant standardization efforts of the RFID community. The EPCglobal network is a set of global technical standards aiming at enabling automatic and instant identification of individual items and sharing this information throughout the supply chain. The F&C (Filtering & Collection) middleware is one of the main components of the EPCglobal network architecture [2] . It uses a single interface to a large number of distributed readers and a large number of capturing applications that may be interested in the collected data. This interface is called the Application Level Interface (ALE) (cf. Figure 1 ). ALE 1.1 comprises five standard APIs, namely Reading, Writing, tag Memory, logical Reader and Access Control APIs. In this paper, we are interested in the Reading API which provides a means for clients (i.e., Capturing applications) to specify in a high-level, declarative way, what tag data they are interested in and gives the corresponding reports in variety of ways. In the sequel, we present the information that an EPC tag carries. Then we give, in more detail, the role played by the Reading API.
Structure of the Electronic Product Code
The Electronic Product Code is a numbering scheme that provides a unique identification for physical objects, assemblies and systems. It serves as a reference to Internet-based information. There are many situations where the EPC stored in an RFID tag are considered as a sensitive information e.g., in contexts where product flows constitute valuable business intelligence. The EPC code elements are shown hereafter to determine the private data carried by the tag.
The EPC is mostly a 96-bit code divided into four fixed partitions, cf. Figure 2 . First, the 8-bit header defines the number, type and length of subsequent data partitions. Second, the EPC manager defines the manufacturer of the item. The next 24-bits defines the object type code. Finally, the 36-bits unique object defines the identification number.
Since, the EPC was not made to replace but to integrate existing numbering schemes, different headers can be used. For example, the well known Global Trade Identification Number (GTIN) that is widely used in the retail industry is integrated into EPC technology. A special version of GTIN (i.e., UPC Version B) originally intended to handle the National Drug Code and National Health Related Item Codes.
Figure 2: EPC composition and GTIN integration
Since this type of EPC carries personal information, it may present some privacy concerns when read without the consent of the holder, i.e., the patient. This unauthorized reading can be handled in the middleware ALE interface. For this aim, let us see the ALE main actions and data types.
Application Level Events Interface
One or more clients can request the ALE interface [4] via a set of methods. Each request causes the ALE engine to take an action and return synchronously a result. The ALE interface also enables clients to subscribe to events that are delivered asynchronously, by using a Uniform Resource Identifier. This URI describes the client address to which the information is delivered. e.g., subscribe(ECSpec, URI) is the method to subscribe to the ALE for an already defined ECSpec.
Primary Data Types
The primary data types associated with the Reading API of ALE are the Event Cycle Specification (ECSpec) and the Event Cycle Reports (ECReports). ECSpec is an XML type used to specify how an event cycle is to be elaborated and reported. ECReports is an XML type containing one or more reports which are generated from one execution of an ECSpec. ECSpec can be triggered in two ways: (1) A standing ECSpec is performed using the define method. Subsequently, one or more clients subscribe to that ECSpec using the subscribe or the poll method. (2) An immediate execution of the ECSpec is submitted via the immediate method.
Event Cycle Specification (ECSpec)
ECSpec describes an event cycle specification and defines the generated view that can result in privacy threats (see Section 4.2). It contains three main parts :
-Logical readers or a list of readers (ECLogicalReaders). Each member of this list is either a name of a single reader or a composite reader used to read tags.
-Boundary Spec. A specification of how the boundaries of event cycles are to be determined (ECBoundarySpec).
They specify the start and stop conditions or the duration or the repetition period of the event cycle.
-Reports specifications (ECReportSpec). Each report specifies one output to be generated from the event cycle and included in the list of reports. Its main fields are:
• include/exclude patterns (ECFilterSpec) to filter what tags are to be included in the final report. A single EPC pattern is a URI-formatted string that denotes a single EPC or a set of EPCs.
• grouping pattern (ECGroupSpec) defines how filtered tags are grouped for reporting. This parameter separates tags into different groups and is only used when some output format are set.
• report set (ECReportSetSpec) is an enumerated type that specifies the set of tags to be considered for the output. i.e., EPCs read in the current event cycle, additions or deletions from the previous event cycle.
• output format (ECReportOutputSpec) specifies how the final set of EPCs is to be reported. If includeCount is true, the report includes also a count of the EPCs in the final set for each group.
Privacy Control Limitations
EPCglobal has proposed an ALE API of access control to use the functionalities of the F&C middleware. This API allows administrative clients to define the access rights of other clients when using the methods and resources proposed by other ALE APIs (e.g., reading, writing to the tag memory). The model is role based access control [19] (RBAC). A role maps to one or more permissions to a particular feature of the ALE API. Two kinds of permissions exist: the function permissions and the data permissions. The first one grants the right to use a particular method of the ALE API (e.g., define, subscribe, unsubscribe), whereas the latter grants the right to use a particular resource or data (e.g., the right to govern a particular reader). The security mechanism of the access control API limits the accesses to critical methods (i.e., subscription to capture tag data). Nevertheless, it does not cope with the details of data aggregation and the use of filtered and combined reports within a request specification. We believe that a fine-grained security on these collected data for privacy concerns has to be handled to prevent applications, even in the same organization, to collect data that undermine people's private lives or reputations.
INTRODUCING PRIVACY DIMENSIONS
The information handled by the EPC code is used to identify assets of an individual or an organization. It could also be useful to know the illness of a person if the EPC identifies a drug. Even by hiding some parts, e.g., by encryption solutions, a partial part of the EPC code can be useful. For example, the combination of an EPC manager identifier and the object class is usually enough to determine the exact kind of object the tag belongs to. Thus, to treat the privacy issues for accurate results, the solution should let all the EPC code to be readable or to entirely filter it. Also, using the grouping pattern of the ECSpec specification can be a solution to prevent non-authorized disclosures. Before delving into the details of our proposal, let us present the privacy dimensions that can be handled in the middleware level then cross them with each field of the ECSpec to extract the fields we have to treat to enforce privacy.
Privacy into the Middleware
Global System 1 has developed the EPC/RFID Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) tool to help companies uncover the privacy risks and perform their own privacy assessments when implementing their RFID applications [6] . These privacy recommendations are defined in accordance with relevant privacy and data protection laws and regulations [15] . Based on these directives, we define the main privacy dimensions in RFID environments, as (1) Purpose specification (2) Collection limitation (3) Data owner access (4) Notification of the data owner (named also openness) (5) Explicit consent (6) Security mechanisms (7) Collection relevance. Some to ensure that only necessary information is collected by holding the accuracy and anonymity specifications in the ECSpec filter (5) Explicit consent to ensure that the data is collected with the knowledge or consent of the data owner. (6) Security mechanisms to protect personal data from unauthorized access or disclosure (e.g., encryption, anonymity) of these dimensions can be expanded in the middleware level while others are dropped to suit its specifications. These latter could be rather enforced in upper layers data processing. We summarize in Table 2 the privacy requirements that can be achieved in the F&C middleware. Here, we are interested in the explicit consent, purpose and accuracy dimensions. Table 3 shows the privacy dimensions that can be treated in each ECSpec field. The purpose of the data request is better specified apart from the ECSpec (cf. Section 6.1).
Privacy Dimensions in ECSpec
The configuration of one reader or a list of readers named logical readers can directly influence the received reports. The use of a non-authorized reader can result in collecting non-authorized state information (e.g., monitoring the number of items in a defined area) or to provide a localization service (e.g., applied to cases of smart smart rooms). The use of a list of readers is mainly viewed in scenarios of tracking an item or a person. For privacy reasons, the configuration of this field should be treated to obtain accurate results. The specification of the boundaries is important from a privacy point of view. e.g, for start/stop trigger conditions, if the person is moving from/to an assumed private place, this event could be a trigger to start/stop tracking the person. The duration declares the period of time during which the EPC tags are authorized to be identified. For privacy reasons, the configuration of the temporal consent is required. Finally, the specification of the reports fields affects the data view. For accurate results, the process of reading can be treated by including and excluding some EPC tags using the regular expressions [4] or by only reporting a set of tags grouped by an EPC code field. In the sequel, we present the privacy policy model and specification of our solution.
PRIVACY POLICY SPECIFICATION
There are several models of privacy in the literature. These models are used to model and integrate privacy requirements into a security policy [1, 12, 14, 25] . The security policy is generally specified according to an access control model to simplify the upgrade of existing information systems. Here, [10] (OrBAC) by reusing most of its implemented existing mechanisms, e.g., managing the security policy by specifying the contexts as complex conditions to define fine grained privacy control requirements. The choice of PrivOrBAC relies on its capacity to handle most of the privacy dimensions appearing in the guidelines and recommendations previously mentioned, e.g., dimensions of consent, accuracy, purposes of the data collection; but of course it can be substituted with another privacy model without disrupting the whole process.
Privacy Contextual Management
PrivOrBAC models the explicit consent as a context, the purpose as a user declared context and the different view levels as an accuracy of the objects. Regarding the data owner privacy preferences, they are included into the contexts of the security policy of the organization.
The Consent Dimension: We define (i) the consent preference view and (ii) the consent context. For (i), users store their consent preferences in the consent preference view (cp). Each object in this view corresponds to a particular data owner preference and has four attributes: dataowner, Recipient (who receives the data related to the object), Target (the requested object), and NeedConsent (a Boolean parameter whose value is true when the consent is needed). (ii) The consent context takes into account the data owner preferences and/or notifies him when his personal information is accessed. Two cases are identified. The first case is when the consent is needed (NeedConsent = true). The data owner response is modeled by a built-in predicate Consent response. That is, if org is an organization, s is a subject, do is a data owner, resp ∈ {accept, deny}, then Consent response(org, do, s, cp, resp) is the response returned by the data owner to the organization. The second case is when the consent of the data owner is not required before revealing his private data to the recipient. In this case, the NeedConsent(cp) attribute is false. The access decision can be made without waiting for the Consent response. By this means, the dataowner chooses which view the subject can access.
The Purpose Dimension The purpose is modeled as a userdeclared context. Each data owner can create purpose objects to specify the purposes for which access to his personal objects are allowed. The purpose objects belonging to a finite set of PO are grouped and inserted in a purpose view. Purpose values range over the domain PV (e.g., Medical research, Inspection). Each purpose object has two attributes:
-Recipient, which is a predicate over domains PO x S defining who takes advantage of the declared purpose. That is, if po is a purpose object belonging to PO and s is a subject, then Recipient(po,s) means that s is the subject who takes advantage of the declared purpose po.
-Declared purpose, which is a predicate over domains PO x PV, associating a purpose value with the declared purpose object. That is, if po is a purpose object and pv is a purpose value, then Declared purpose(po, pv) means that pv is the purpose value associated with the declared purpose po. By inserting a po in his purpose subview, a data owner declares that another subject (a Recipient) will perform some activity in a given context.
The Accuracy Dimension Privacy enforcement requires the use of different levels of accuracy depending on the purpose and the subject requesting the collection of the private data. This principle is consistent with the privacy directive of collection limitation. Private objects of each data owner may have different levels of accuracy [1] . We can consider a hierarchy between the root view of a data owner that groups the initially collected objects and their sub-views. These sub-views group the derived objects that have different ac- curacies. We recall that Sub view is a relation over domains Org x V x V, if org is an organization, and v1 and v2 are views, then Sub view (org, v1, v2 ) means that in organization org, view v1 is a sub-view of v2. Figure 3 shows the accuracy-based object hierarchy related to EPC data. Each data owner defines his own private data hierarchy, composed of different data views e.g., a view of the EPC codes or a view of the EPC quantity. The data owner can then specify different privacy policy and access control for each view.
In the sequel, we specify our privacy rules using the PrivOr-BAC model applied to a motivating scenario.
Motivating Scenario
This section illustrates a scenario in a Hospital Ho for a remote monitoring system. To define the OrBAC organizational policy of Ho , we consider the following entities.
Figure 4: Scenario of monitoring applications
The elderly patient Bob is remotely monitored at home from different services of the Hospital (cf. Figure 4) . Bob suffers from hypertension and from alzheimer. The medications he daily takes are put in his medication shelf and are identified with EPC codes i.e., every one pill is related to one EPC code. The nurse of the cardiology service has to monitor Bob twice a day. Every time he takes his hypertension medication from the shelf, the total number of pills decreases. The nurse has not to track the tags that are related to the alzheimer disease. This latter information is considered as private with respect to the patient preferences. In the other side, the Pharmacy application has to monitor the medication shelf twice a week, to check if it contains the required number of medications. Thus, it only needs a quantity information about the medications rather than their entire EPC code.
Based on these assumptions, the nurse of cardiology service is only interested in objects of type C, i.e., the control is done over the field object of the EPC code (cf. Figure 2) , describing the reference of the hypertension medication. The ECSpec is configured to only consider deletions set of tags, i.e., tags deleted from the previous event cycle. Finally, the pharmacist is only interested in tags quantity depending on their manager and object codes.
OrBAC Specification
OrBAC provides a set of concepts to express the security policy and enables making distinction between an abstract policy specifying organizational requirements and its concrete implementation. For example, abstract organization privileges, such as permission, are expressed through the predicate Permission(org, r, a, v, c) . It means that the organization org grants a permission to role r to realize the activity a on the view v in the context c.
The privacy rules corresponding to the motivating scenario are expressed in the OrBAC model as follows:
(1) the nurse related to the cardiology application is only permitted to receive data of patients suffering from hypertension, with the context Consent nurse and the view TagCtype in the user-declared context patient nurse: Rule1 = Permission(Ho, NurseApp, Subscribe, TagC type, Consent nurse) where the context Consent nurse is specified as (Ho, do, s, cp, accept) ).
That is, the Consent nurse context holds if there is an object cp belonging to the Consent preference view which has the attributes s and NeedConsent(cp). Rule2= Permission(Ho, NurseApp, Subscribe, TagC type, User declared(patient nurse)) where the context patient nu rse is defined as follows:
s) ∧ Declared purpose(po,pv) ∧ Nurse(s',s).
That is, in the organization Ho, a subject s performs an action α on the purpose object po in the context patient nurse if there is a purpose object po used in the subview do-purpose of the data owner (associated with his defined objects) by Ho such that s is the recipient associated with po (represented by the application-dependent predicate Recipient(po,s)) and s is the nurse of the patient s'. cf. Section 5.1, for details. where the context Consent pharmacist is specified by: do,s,cp,accept) ). That is, the Consent pharmacist context holds if there is an object cp belonging to the Consent-preference view, which has the attributes s and N eedConsent(cp). Rule4= Permission(Ho, PharmacyApp, Subscribe, AllTagNumber, User declared(patient pharmacist)) where the context patient pharmacist is defined as follows:
That is, in the organization Ho, a subject s performs an action α on the purpose object po in the context patient phar macist if there is a purpose object po used in the subview do-purpose of the data owner such that s is the recipient associated with po and s is the pharmacist of the patient s .
It is assumed that the patient (i.e., the data owner) has already declared the contexts patient nurse, patient pharmacist, Consent nurse and Consent pharmacy.
The roles nurse and pharmacist are managed by the access control API of the ALE middleware interface.
PRIVACY CONTROLLER INTEG-RATION INTO FOSSTRAK
To implement our solution, we use the open-source plateform Fosstrak [7] . Fosstrak provides an EPCglobal-certified EPCIS (EPC Information Service) Repository. It consists of three separate modules: the reader module, the filtering&col-lection middleware module, and the EPCIS module. These modules are implemented with the corresponding EPCglobal interfaces specifications e.g, the ALE interface. Here, we focus on the middleware module, the central point where begins the specification of events to be collected and reported.
Relying on the ALE interactions (cf. Section 3) and the privacy dimensions required at this level (cf. Section 4), we consider that the subscription to an ECSpec is the action concerned with the privacy issues i.e., since the defined ECSpec is not executed until the subscription method is performed, the collection of data is only triggered by this action. In the sequel, we consider the subscription request to test our Privacy Controller module. Let us first present the Privacy Controller activities when triggered by a subscription request, then detail our testing scenario.
Privacy Controller Activities & Algorithms
To subscribe to an event cycle and receive related reports, the clients subscribe to an entity called the ReportsGenerator [7] via the ALE interface. The ReportsGenerator is the entity responsible for ensuring that the event cycle is started/stopped and that subscribers receive the resulting reports. In addition, we define the PrivacyController as the entity handling the compliance of the requests with the predefined privacy policy. Figure 5 depicts the relation between the two defined entities (i.e., ReportsGenerator and PrivacyController). The ReportsGenerator instantiates the PrivacyController with the specification ECSpec, the recipient address URI and the purpose to verify the properties of the request. The PrivacyController outputs a Grant or Deny access to the specified data or updates the ECSpec for accurate results.
Privacy Controller Activities
Note that the purpose attribute, can either be added to the ECSpec XML content or to the subscribe request sent to the ALE middleware. We add this attribute to the subscribe request for the following reasons. First, this way, the ECSpec can be used by many ALE Clients and with possibly different purposes. Second, adding the purpose parameter to the request avoids distorting the ECSpec and leaves it consistent with the standard EPCglobal specification.
Regarding privacy preferences, the data owner specifies them using the PrivOrBAC model [1] depending on the privacy dimensions enforced in the system. Each privacy preference is associated with a recipient address and a purpose on which the preference is defined. This preference turns around a set of targets that the recipient aims to access. A decision attribute, related to each target, defines whether the data owner gives his consent to access the data, and in the positive case, in which accuracy, the data will be disclosed. ALEExceptionMessage ← "The URI is already subscribed to this specification spec" 4: else 5: if (PrivacyController.verify(spec, URI, purp)) then
Algorithm 1 Verifiy the subscription
Input: ECSpec spec, name spName, purpose purp, recipient URI Output:
6:
ECSpec spec' ← PrivacyController.update(spec)
7:
if spec' != Null then
8:
spec ← spec'
9:
Subscribers.put(URI) 10:
ALEMessage ← The update is incorrect
12:
end if
13: else

14:
ALEMessage ← The URI has not the right to subscribe to ECspec with the purpose purp
15:
16: end if
Privacy Control Algorithms for Subscriptions
The PrivacyController is defined in the Fosstrak code as an independent class that ReportsGenerator calls for new subscriptions. Our PrivacyController entity uses two main methods: Verify for the verification of the subscription parameters, i.e., the purpose, the ECSpec name and the logical reader field and Update for the update of the ECSpec. The Verify method returns a boolean: False when the entered parameters are not coherent, e.g., the specified purpose and logical reader are not adequate for this access and True when the ECSpec is entirely allowed or if it is allowed but with a further filtering for privacy reasons. In this latter case, the Update method is called. This method updates the ECSpec with the corresponding data owner preferences (i.e., compares the ECSpec entered by the recipient and the preferences of the data owner, then updates each field of the ECSpec, excepting the logical readers). At the end, the Update method checks for the correctness of the resulted ECSpec. In the case it is not correct, the method outputs Null.
Algorithm 1 shows a snapshot of the Verify method.
Step 1 verifies the purpose entered with the ECSpec in a list of allowed purposes for the specified recipient.
Step 2 checks the name of the ECSpec. If it is a new spName (Step 4), it checks for the logical reader field in the given ECSpec.
Step 8 shows the case of a not allowed logical reader specified in the ECSpec. In this case, no possible update is to be done and the subscription is refused.
Algorithm 2 shows the subscribe method included in the modified Fosstrak ReportsGenerator class. Steps 2 and 3 verify the existence of an already subscribed recipient, identified by its URI address with the same ECSpec.
Step 5 verifies the permission of the recipient to subscribe to the reports notification with the entered ECSpec and purpose relying on the defined privacy policy. In the positive case (Step 6), a call to the Update method is performed. If the output of the update method is not Null, then the original ECspec is updated with a new filtered ECspec.
Step 8 adds the address URI to the list of validated subscribers in case of permission. The check for correctness avoids for example obtaining empty reports. Note that for checking the correctness, some criteria should be satisfied. In [23] , the authors proposed three correctness criteria that should be satisfied by any query processing algorithm: (i) the Soundness criteria, when the rewritten ECSpec returns only correct answers, i.e., answers to the initial query. (ii) the Maximality criteria, when the rewritten ECSpec returns as much information as possible and, (iii) the Security criteria, if the result of ECSpec respects the security and privacy policy of the queried system.
As an example, if the period of tags detection specified by the requester is different from the period specified by the data owner, the minimum of the two values is considered. Thus, no empty reports are generated and the criteria of maximality is applied.
Testing Scenario and Results
To test the subscription scenario, all roles and interfaces shown in Figure 1 have to be well configured, and connected. We first give the implementation details that lead to our results. Then, we describe the messages flow related to the subscription activity applied on the F&C middleware.
Implementation details: Our privacy module written in Java, is added to the version 1.2.0 of the Fosstrak middleware. To connect the F&C middleware to different readers, we consider the EPCglobal Low Level Reader Protocol [5] (LLRP) as a reader protocol via the LLRPCommander tool. LLRPCommander provides a number of features to help configuring and managing LLRP-compliant RFID readers. To simulate LLRP readers and generate tag data, we use the reader emulator Rifidi 1 . The ALE Client (i.e., capturing application) we use is the F&C Web Client application which comes with the Fosstrak platform. Finally, the PrivOrBAC policy is stored in a dedicated server and user's preferences are accessed via a web service [17] , using the REpresentational State Transfer (REST) architecture.
Sequence diagram and generated reports: Figure 6 depicts a sequence diagram visualizing the messages flow related to the subscription activity with the new privacy controller module we have integrated into the Fosstrak platform. We assume that the client and the recipient of the report represent the same entity. The goal is to receive the reports corresponding to the Client specification, when the context holds with the rules defined in the privacy policy. 1: The Client subscribes to an EventCycle, by entering the ECSpec, the recipient address (URI) and the purpose (from a purpose list). Figure 7 illustrates a snapshot of an ECSpec rendered into XML. In this example, the code is formatted in EPC tag URI: 0000389 refers to the manager code for 1 http://www.transcends.co/community a given corporation, and 000162 denotes the product code for hypertension medication, where GTIN-96 tag encodings are used. The reportSet field is set to DELETIONS, to only detect deleted tags from the shelf1 reader. We assume that the nurse is only interested in the epc code, which matches the Type C tag, regardless of its serial number. 2: The ALE subscribes the Client to the ReportsGenerator that exclusively corresponds to this ECSpec. 3.1: The ReportsGenerator instantiates the PrivacyController to verify the request depending on the privacy policy. 3.2: In the case the purpose and the logical reader of the ECSpec are authorized, an update process verifies if the remaining fields of the ECSpec corrrespond to the privacy policy. 4.1/4.1.1: The PrivacyController checks the Client request. When the request does not meet the privacy policy (e.g., more than the Type C medication is specified for that URI Recipient), or if the updated ECSpec is not correct, a deny message is returned to the ALE interface stating that the privacy policy does not allow the present subscription. 4.2: The PrivacyController checks the request and possibly update it. In the present case, the access is granted, and therefore, the PrivacyController allows the ReportsGenerator related to that Event Cycle to continue the processing. 5: The ReportsGenerator starts the EventCycle. The EventCycle now processes tags from the readers. 6/7: The LogicalReader(s) add(s) Tags to the EventCycle. 8/9: When the EventCycle reaches its boundaries, the reports are generated and sent back to the Client through the ReportsGenerator. Figure 8 shows a snapshot of the resulted ECReport for the nurse subscription, presented in XML, reporting the set of tags deleted from the previous event cycle.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the difference between reports views. It depicts a snapshot of the ECSpec and ECReports related to the pharmacy application. The pharmacist has to specify the quantity of tags, for each different manager code.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown the importance of introducing privacy solutions at an early stage of RFID data processing to prevent unintentional disclosures of sensitive information. The goal is to ensure that the communication line that extends from readers to middleware and enterprise applications responds to privacy requirements. First, we addressed some privacy concerns of the EPCglobal technology which is currently one of the predominant standardization efforts in the RFID community. Second, we provided a policy-driven approach to enforce privacy in such a technology with dimensions of declared purpose, accuracy and explicit consent. Third, we provided a proof-of-concept prototype that shows the feasibility of our approach. Currently, we are measuring the execution time needed for our verification and updating approach to compare it with the standard case. This allows us to bring some insight on optimizing our privacy controller. In addition, we intend to find a trade off between the different correctness criteria of our updating algorithm, as in our approach, the priority is given to the maximality criteria. Finally, when several middleware events go to one aggregation entity, a privacy-preserving problem could be raised, even if the privacy is handled separately in each middleware. As future work, we aim to find a trade off between data privacy preservation and secure data aggregation, in such centralized architectures.
